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1 Motivation
The most crucial security criteria of voting schemes are secrecy and integrity of the votes. In order
to ensure an adequate level of security, cryptographic voting schemes generally distribute trust among
several election authorities. Independent of the concrete Internet voting instantiation (shuﬄing based,
homomorphic tallying), cryptographic key distribution and verifiable distributed decryption is of central
importance to most of these schemes. Requiring several election authorities to collaborate in order to
decrypt votes bears, however, the risk of robustness issues because failures of single authorities might pre-
vent the system from calculating the election result. Consequently, when running elections, an adequate
trade-off between secrecy and robustness must be achieved.
Consider the following examples of real-world elections: During the Internet voting that was run in
parallel to 2003 parliamentary elections in Catalonia, Spain, a secret key was centrally generated and
distributed among n (in their case n was equal to 7) electoral board members [5]. During the university
presidential election at Universite´ catholique de Louvain [3], which used the Helios Internet voting scheme
version 2.0 (the original Helios 1.0 was invented in [2]), a key was generated in a fully distributed manner.
Afterwards, in order to improve robustness, a copy of each individual secret key was generated such that
each secret key was in possession of two authorities. In the key generation scheme used in the 2011
elections in Norway [6], the election key was generated distributively between two machines and the two
secret key shares were further distributed onto the smart cards of election authorities via a (t, n) threshold
sharing scheme. While these examples seem reasonable for the election organizers, with respect to secrecy
and robustness trade-offs, significant shortcomings can be identified. Either trade-offs are not adequately
considered, e.g., because of high organizational effort, or trade-offs are not optimal, i.e., improvements
and decreases of secrecy and robustness respectively are not proportional. The former case corresponds
to the Norwegian election where secrecy could be improved by running further generating machines.
This however results in a significant organizational effort as election authorities would have to obtain
(via their smart cards) key shares from all machines. The latter case is seen at the KU Leuven election,
where through copying robustness is slightly increased by 1 to (2, 2n) (2 out of 2n authorities might
collaborate in order to violate robustness) rather than (1, n) without copying, while secrecy drops down
by one half to (n, 2n) rather than (n, n) without copying.
On the other side, scientific works providing optimal trade-offs with respect to secrecy and robustness
have been invented, e.g., [4]. In spite of their implementation, e.g. [1], their usage is not yet widely seen in
practice. One reason for this lack is that implementations are generally optimized for desktop machines,
rely on wireless LAN connections to establish distributed keys, are generally integrated into specific
voting schemes, and in summary are not tailored towards modular, spontaneous, and practical use.
2 A Smartphone Application as a Solution for Election Authorities
Motivated by these insights and the increasing spread of smartphones, our goal is to develop a practical
and usable modular smartphone application providing an optimal secrecy-robustness trade-off. The ap-
plication we are developing runs on Android OS, which is open for developers and enjoys wide-spread use
on modern smartphones. The XMPP protocol, which is one of the standard communication protocols,
is used for communication between the users, and messages are stored in XML format, which is also
a standard in saving data. As XMPP enables creation of unique message formats, we made use of this
feature as well. Messages are signed with RSA keys, while the underlying PKI (at this point) is hard-
coded. Currently, our application makes use of Gmail accounts for user authentication as Android users
generally have one by default. The two important components of our scheme are the robust distributed
key generation and robust distributed decryption.
Key Generation and Decryption. Our application builds upon Gennaro et al.’s distributed key
generation scheme [4]. The scheme we implement for the decryption is described in [1]. The commitments,
computed in the key distribution, are used in order to verify the partial decryptions, which ultimately
ensures universal verifiability of the decrypted votes. After the partial decryptions are exchanged among
the authorities, each authority can verify them and reconstruct the decryption of the votes.
User Process. After starting the application (see Figure 1(a)), the authority has the possibility to
setup a new election, initiate the decryption of a running election, or export the results and correctness
proofs of a tallied election. In order to setup an election, the initiating authority fixes the election
parameters (see Figure 1(b)) by providing an election name, the URL where encrypted votes are stored,
nominating other election authorities, and fixing the threshold value. Afterwards, nominated authorities
receive an invitation indicating the initiating authority and other election parameters fixed by the initiator
(see Figure 1(c)). After the key has been distributively generated between the authorities, the election
is stored as running election. After the voting phase has finished, any authority can initiate the tallying
process of this election (see Figure 1(d)) which starts the distributed decryption among involved election
authorities. Eventually, election results and their integrity proofs can be exported.
(a) Main Menu. (b) Parameter Choice. (c) Invitation. (d) Running Elections
Fig. 1. The Smartphone Application for Election Authorities.
Status and Future Work. To date, the developed prototype application represents a first step in
the right direction. Nevertheless, several challenges are to be addressed in the future: The application is
not limited to a specific election type, though in some cases additional legal criteria should be considered.
Since the application is intended for election authorities and not for voters, the aspects of accessibility
so far were beyond our scope, but we plan to consider them in future. We currently investigate how
the application can be integrated within established PKIs of states or companies. Furthermore, we
are currently supported by usability experts and election authorities in making the application fit the
expectations of end-users. In the future, we plan to improve the application’s performance by integrating
techniques like batch proofs and optimized user synchronization. For further information, do not hesitate
to contact one of the authors.
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